Extra Work Under Federal Government Construction Contracts by Cuneo, Gilbert A.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 4 Article 3 
1955 
Extra Work Under Federal Government Construction Contracts 
Gilbert A. Cuneo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gilbert A. Cuneo, Extra Work Under Federal Government Construction Contracts, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 556 
(1955). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the bar, a board composed of lawyers is more satisfactory."' However,
some board members maintain that the presence of an engineer or archi-
tect on the board is more helpful than the testimony of experts on tech-
nical engineering problems.
It has been proposed that all the contract appeal boards be united
in a single board or court which would determine contract appeals for
all federal agencies. Regardless of their ultimate organization, contract
appeal boards will continue to perform an important function in the con-
struction of public works.
EXTRA WORK UNDER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
GILBERT A. CUNEO*
WHETHER it be Mrs. Jones building her dream house or Uncle Sam
constructing a Rocky Mountain dam, the contractor may encounter
extras and changes in specifications. In his business relations with Mrs.
Jones, the contractor is generally in the superior position of the well-in-
formed negotiator who drafts the agreement, including its fine print, for
the signature of one who frequently is unfamiliar with construction
terminology and unaware of the legal significance of the contractual
provisions. Not so dominant is the contractor's position in his relations
with the Federal Government. His voice in drafting the Government
construction contract is hardly audible. He must perform under a con-
tract consisting primarily of standard articles, specifications, and draw-
ings prepared by the Government. Fortunately for the contractor, as
for Mrs. Jones, certain moral and civil laws, as well as economic and
political factors, preserve a balance between the powerful and the weak
that encourages each to do business with the other.
A Government in a free enterprise democracy must satisfy many of its
needs from private sources. The United States Government contracts
for its requirements under the law of the land. When it comes down
from its position of sovereignty and enters the market place, it submits
itself to the same laws that govern individuals.' As with all generalities,
there are exceptions to that statement. We need only mention a few of
61. See Reilly, A Return to Legislative Intent, 43 Geo. L.J. 372 (1955).
* Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Member, Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals.
1. Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875).
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those exceptions to facilitate our discussion of extra work under a Gov-
ernment construction contract.
A difference flows from the acts of the Government as a sovereign
and as a contractor. Sovereign acts are those performed in its legislative
or executive capacity which are public or general in scope, affecting
Government as well as private contracts.2 The United States as a con-
tractor cannot be held liable for the public acts of the United States as
a sovereign.3 On the other hand, the Government as a contractor is
bound by its contracts properly made. Valid contracts of the United
States and the rights of private individuals arising out of them are pro-
tected by the fifth amendment. Thus, Congress may not directly re-
pudiate the Government's own contract. 4
Another difference between Government contracts and private con-
tracts that makes the relationship between Mrs. Jones and the con-
tractor different from that between the Government and the contractor
is the applicable law of agency with regard to authority. The official
purporting to act for the Government must have actual authority which
may be express or implied. Officers of the United States are special
agents with only such powers as are expressly given or necessarily im-
plied.5 Whoever deals with a Government agent does so at his own risk
as to the agent's authority.6 The doctrine of apparent authority is not
applicable to the Government on the grounds of public policy.7
Another such difference that might affect the contractor's rights
against the Government is the doctrine of implied contracts. The Gov-
ernment has consented to be sued on "any contract, express or implied." 8
This consent has been construed by the courts to extend to suits on con-
tracts implied in fact but not to suits on contracts implied in law.P In
2. Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383 (1865).
3. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925). An act of the Government in its
sovereign capacity may, however, be an excusable cause of delay under the "Termination
For Default-Damages For Delay-Time Extensions" article of the contract (art. 5).
4. Lynch v. United States, 292 US. 571 (1934).
5. Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
6. United States v. Christensen, 50 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Ill. 1943).
7. Whiteside v. United States, 93 US. 247 (1876). It has frequently been written that
there can be no estoppel against the Government. However, for a dis li'on of such
authorities and a holding that the Government is bound by the doctrine of estoppel where
(1) there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity to suit; (2) the agent whose conduct
is relied upon to work an estoppel acted within the scope of his authority lawfully con-
ferred; and (3) application of the doctrine does not bring a result that is either inequitable
or contrary to law, see United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 131 F. Supp. 6S (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
8. 28 US.C.A. § 1346 (1955).
9. United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926).
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order to recover against the Government on a contract implied in fact,
it is necessary to prove that: (1) the Government received a benefit,
(2) authority existed to make an express contract involving the subject
matter of the contract sought to be implied, and (3) the benefit was re-
ceived for the Government by an authorized officer. Recovery may be
had on the basis of an implied contract to pay reasonable value of what
is received by the Government under an authorized express contract
which fails to comply with prescribed statutory formalities, such as re-
duction to writing.10
Mrs. Jones' agreement with the contractor would be governed by the
law of the state where it was executed and performed, whereas the con-
tractor's agreement with the Government will be construed, and the
rights of the parties thereunder will be determined, in accordance with
Federal law." The contractor will also have to realize, in the words
of Mr. Justice Holmes, that "men must turn square corners when they
deal with the Government." 2 He may, however, be somewhat com-
forted by the comment of Mr. Justice Jackson, that ". . . there is no
reason why the square corners should constitute a one-way street.' 8l
The contractor's lump sum construction contract with the Government
will be on Standard Form 23, dated March 1953.11 General Regulation
No. 13, developed cooperatively by the General Services Administration,
other civilian agencies, and the Department of Defense, prescribes the
use of this form.' 5 It must be used by Federal agencies for all construc-
10. United States v. Andrews, 207 U.S.'229 (1907); Burchiel v. United States, 4 Ct.
Cl. 549 (1868); Emery v. United States, 13 F. 2d 658 (D. Conn. 1926).
11. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Clearfield Trust Com-
pany v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). Prior to these decisions Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), was considered by some to require that Government
contracts be governed by state law. In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 131 F.
Supp. 65 (S.D. Cal. 1955), which was a condemnation proceeding, the court followed
the Tompkins doctrine without mentioning the Allegheny County or Clearfield Trust cases.
12. Rock Island, A & L R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
13. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
14. 1 Commerce Clearing House, Government Contracts Reporter (hereinafter referred
to as "CCH GCR"), § 18,201. The Standard Form 23 set out in 44 Code Fed. Regs, §
54.13 (Supp. 1954) is an outdated form and is no longer being used.
15. Issued March 19, 1953, 1A CCH GCR, § 24,965; Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (hereinafter referred to as "ASPR"), § 16-008, 32 Code Fed. Regs., § 415.0O4
.(Supp. 1954), 1A CCH GCR, § 29,929. The General Services Administration acts pur-
suant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 41 U.S.C.A. § 251
(1949). The ASPR was issued by the Procurement Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force, jointly on May 19, 1948, under the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947,
62 Stat. 21, 41 U.S.C.A. § 151. By directive of the Secretary of Defense, ASPR was adopted
as a regulation of the Department of Defense on December 1, 1952, pursuant to 41
U.S.C.A. § 162.
[Vol. 24
1956] GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 559
tion work, except for (1) negotiated contracts, (2) contracts not ex-
ceeding $2,000, (3) contracts for the construction, alteration and repair
of vessels, (4) contracts for construction, alteration and repair work
in foreign countries, and (5) as otherwise provided by regulations of
the General Services Administration.
Whenever the contractor, because of an order received from the Gov-
ernment, must perform work not specified or omit work required by his
contract, he should carefully study his contract to ascertain his rights
and to determine the procedure to be followed in protecting them.
Standard Form 23 has been developed as a result of many years of ex-
perience. Its use eliminates certain risks of the contractor for which
he would otherwise make allowances in his bid. The Government thereby
obtains its construction work at a lower cost. In order to permit the
Government to modify the work after the contract is awarded, the
"Changes" article was included in Standard Form 23. It gives the Gov-
ernment that right, but at the same time it also compensates the con-
tractor for such modification in his performance by providing that for
any change he will receive a compensating equitable adjustment in time
and money.
I. EXTRAS
For any extra work the contractor must find a basis for relief under
the "Changes" article. No longer is there a specific "Extras" article in
Standard Form 23. The present "Changes" article has a caveat which
provides that no charge for any extra work or material will be allowed
except as therein provided. Article 5 of a previous version of Standard
Form 23 was entitled "Extras," and provided as follows:
"Except as otherwise herein provided, no charge for any extra work or material
will be allowed unless the same has been ordered in writing by the contracting officer
and the price stated in such order."' 6
Many lawyers are of the opinion that such a separate provision in
addition to the "Changes" article is unnecessary. Every extra under a
construction contract probably involves a change but, as will be seen
later herein, not every change involves an extra, as where work is
deleted. The stated purpose for having such a specific provision was to
protect the Government against claims by contractors for extra work
performed voluntarily or on the basis of oral understandings with super-
intendents, architects or others not authorized to act.' 7 The "Extras"
article did not contain any grant of authority to order extras without the
16. Approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, revised April 3, 1942; 44 Code Fed.
Regs., § 54.13 (Supp. 1954).
17. Ford v. United States, 17 Ct. CL 60 (1881).
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consent of the contractor. The courts have relied on it18 to allow the
contractor to recover when the approval by the head of the department
was not obtained for a change order as required under a previous form of
the "Changes" article.1 9
II. CHANGES
In one form or another the "Changes" article in Government contracts
can be traced back at least to Civil War days.20 Article 3 of Standard
Form 23A, General Provisions (Construction Contracts), which is a part
of Standard Form 23 now in use, provides as follows:
"3. CHANGES-The Contracting Officer may at any time, by a written order, and
without notice to the sureties, make changes in the drawings and/or specifications of
this contract and within the general scope thereof. If such changes cause an increase
or decrease in the amount due under this contract, or in the time required for its
performance, an equitable adjustment shall be made and the contract shall be modi-
fied in writing accordingly. Any claim of the Contractor for adjustment under this
clause must be asserted in writing within 30 days from the date of receipt by the
Contractor of the notification of change: Provided, however, That the Contracting
Officer, if he determines that the facts justify such action, may receive and consider,
and adjust any such claim asserted at any time prior to the date of final settlement
of the contract. If the parties fail to agree upon the adjustment to be made the dis-
pute shall be determined as provided in Clause 6 hereof. But nothing provided in
this clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the prosecution of the
work as changed. Except as otherwise herein provided, no charge for any extra work
or material will be allowed."
To avoid difficulties, the provisions of this article should be carefully
studied and meticulously followed. The field of changes is one of the
18. W. H. Armstrong & Company v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 519, 1 Commerce Clear-
ing House, Contract Cases Federal (hereinafter referred to as "CCF"), 468 (1943).
Originally when first published in 1944 Contract Cases Federal reported the full official
texts of the decisions rendered by the Federal courts, as well as those of the War Depart-
ment Board of Contract Appeals (hereinafter referred to as "W.D.BCA"; in 1947 Its name
was changed to the Army Board of Contract Appeals, hereinafter referred to as "A.BCA"),
on the subject of Government contracts. The decisions begin with those first decided by
the latter Board in 1942. With Volume 3 CCF the decisions of the Navy Board of Con-
tract Appeals were included. Beginning with Volume 4 CCF, only digests of certain deci-
sions were reported, including some decisions of the Comptroller General, that pertained
to Government contracts. In Volume 4 CCF the decisions of the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (hereinafter referred to as "ASBCA") were first reported. The ASBCA
was created by the joint directive of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force,
effective as of May 1, 1949. Digests of the decisions of the Interior Department Board
of Contract Appeals (hereinafter referred to as "I.BCA") were first reported in the cur-
rent volume, which is Volume 6 CCF. The I.BCA was established by Order No. 2509,
Amendment No. 22, effective December 31, 1954. The purpose, organization, and procedure
of these Boards will be discussed more fully later herein.
19. Article 3, Standard Form 23, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, revised
April 3, 1942; 44 Code Fed. Regs., § 54.13 (Supp. 1954).
20. McCord v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 155 (1873).
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most fertile for the growth of disputes with the contracting officer. The
latter has the authority to act for the Government under the "Changes"
article and under the contract in general. In analyzing precedents of the
courts and administrative agencies, attention must be given to the
language of the particular "Changes" article that was under review, for
many such decisions are based on provisions no longer a part of the
article.
Delays in Making Changes
On occasion in the course of the construction of a dam, an airport, or
a hospital, the Government has doubts about the wisdom of proceeding
in accordance with the original specifications, just as Mrs. Jones might
doubt that she actually must have a third bathroom in her house, even
though she has planned on it during most of her adult life. The Court
of Claims has repeatedly held that as an incident to its rights under the
"Changes" article to issue change orders, the Government has the right,
without liability, to delay a contractor's performance of the contract
work for a reasonable period while it arrives at a decision as to the pro-
visions to be incorporated in a change order which it desires to issue, or as
to whether a change order is in fact to be issued. -?1 What is reasonable or
unreasonable depends upon the extent of the proposed changes and other
material circumstances. Recently the Court of Claims, in F. H. McGraw
& Co. v. United States,2- decided that a delay of 30 days would have
been reasonable, but since the actual delay was 159 days, it held the
Government liable in damages for 129 days of delay. In I. A. Ross &
Co. v. United States,23 the Court of Claims in one instance held a delay
of 24 days to be unreasonable to the extent of 15 days and in another
instance held a delay of 35 days to be unreasonable to the extent of 29
days. The items of expense allowed as damages in these two cases be-
cause of the unreasonable delay were field office overhead and ex-
21. George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. CL 70, 69 F. Supp. 409, 4 CCF, par.
60,232 (1947); James Stewart & Co. v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 284, 63 F. Supp. 653,
3 CCF 1479 (1946); Harwood-Nebel Construction Co. v. United States, 105 CL CL 116
(1945); Severin v. United States, 102 CL Cl. 74, 1 CCF 542 (1943), cert. denied, 322 US.
733 (1944); Silberblatt & Lasker v. United States, 101 CL CL 54, 2 CCF 253 (1944);
Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. CL 15, 1 CCF 547 (1943); Magoba Construction Co.
v. United States, 99 CL CL 662, 1 CCF 611 (1943). General Condition 11, "Suspension
Of Work," of military construction contracts permits the contracting officer to suspend
work for the convenience of the Government and provides for certain adjustments to be
given the contractor for such suspension.
22. 131 Ct. Cl. 501, 130 F. Supp. 394 (1955). In Silberblatt & Lasker, Inc. v. United
States, 101 Ct. CL 54, 2 CCF 253 (1944), damages were not allowed for delay of 3
months and 17 days because of failure of proof. General principles on point di.--sced
in Magoba Construction Co, Inc. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 662, 1 CCF 611 (1943).
23. 126 Ct. Cl. 323, 115 F. Supp. 187 (1953).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
pense, allocable portion of home office overhead, loss because of in-
ability to maintain effective and efficient planning and coordination of
work, cost of equipment, and loss of efficiency because of having to per-
form concrete work in cold weather.
Recovery of damages for the Government's unreasonable delay in
making permitted changes is completely independent of the contractor's
right to an equitable adjustment for any delay or expense that results
from performance in accordance with the change order. This is clearly
shown in the J. A. Ross24 case, where recovery for damages because of
such unreasonable delay was permitted even though the contractor had
accepted an extension of time and a $15,000 payment as an equitable
adjustment for the change without reserving the right to sue for the
damages incident to the Government's unreasonable delay in deciding
about the change.
Authority to Order Changes
The contracting officer or his authorized representative is empowered
to order changes under the "Changes" article. He, however, is frequently
not present on the job site. Other Government personnel, such as in-
spectors, are present most of the time. On occasion, as the work pro-
gresses, Government personnel make "suggestions" to the contractor
which at times might even be accompanied by statements of possible
work rejections if the "suggestions" are not followed. The contractor
must be cautious under such circumstances. The contracting officer may
act through authorized representatives but, as was pointed out above,
the courts have held that the contractor bears the risk of knowing the
authority of Government agents. Since the doctrine of apparent author-
ity does not apply to the Government, the contractor cannot rely on any
appearance of authority that the Government agent might have. Many
Government construction contracts have a special condition (SC-10)
which specifically states that no inspector is authorized to change any
provision of the specifications without written authorization of the con-
tracting officer.
The weight of the burden upon the contractor to determine the au-
thority of Government agents has led to liberal decisions in determining
who are authorized representatives of the contracting officer to perform
certain acts.2 Even under those circumstances the contractor would
still run a substantial risk in hoping for such liberality on review.
As far as legal protection of rights is concerned, the contractor should,
as stated by the courts, protest to the contracting officer any demand of
24. Ibid.
25. Jarvis Manufacturing Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 1723 (1954); Keith S. Merritt,
ASBCA No. 85, 4 CCF, par. 60,740 (1949).
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a Government agent which he feels to be improper." As a practical
matter the contractor might be willing to take the calculated risk of
complying with what he believes to be an unauthorized order and sub-
sequently endeavor to have the contracting officer ratify the unau-
thorized act. Such ratification would be retroactive to the time of the
unauthorized order 2 7
To be within the "Changes" article the change must be ordered by
the contracting officer and must not be merely the result of voluntary
action on the part of the contractor. The use of better material or per-
formance by a more skillful procedure than specified in the contract,
even if approved by the Government inspector and resulting in a better
job, is not within the "Changes" article if the contractor merely acts
voluntarily.2 8 Instead of voluntarily making a change, the contractor
should request that the contracting officer order the change. If the con-
tracting officer then embodies the suggestions in a change order, such
a change is within the "Changes" article. That may be true even if the
change is made for the convenience of the contractor. The Government,
however, would be entitled to a decrease in price for any resulting
savings in cost of performance.29
The contracting officer may insist that certain work be performed as
part of the requirements of the contract which the contractor believes
is a change in the specifications or drawings. In such a situation the
contractor must be careful to preserve his rights. If the contractor's
belief is correct that he is entitled to a change order which the contract-
ing officer refuses to issue, then the Government has breached the con-
tract by refusal to comply with the "Changes" article. At that point
the contractor has a right to sue for breach of contract. If he continues
performance, whicldi as a practical matter he will in most instances do,
the contractor should serve a written protest upon the contracting officer
before he continues performance of the work in question. Otherwise, he
26. Cauldwell-Wingate Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 193 (1947); J. A. Ross & Co.
v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 323, 115 F. Supp. 187 (1953).
27. Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461 (1901); Ford v. United States, 17 Ct. CL 60 (1881).
28. Albert & Harrison, Inc. v. United States (S.D.N.Y. 1943), only reported in 1 CCF
658; Eitel-McCullough, Inc, ASBCA No. 754 (1951); S. A. de Transports Nautilus,
ASBCA No. 793 (1951); Basich Brothers Construction Co., A.BCA No. 1592, 4 CCF, par.
60,756 (1949); J. D. Kissel, W.D.BCA No. 1518, 4 CCF, par. 60,399 (1947); Arthur Murray
Co., WD.BCA No. 569, 2 CCF 743 (1944). Where the method for cleaning stone specified
in the contract was not satisfactory and the contractor used a more expensive different
method not mentioned in the contract, but the Government agents refused to issue a change
order, the contractor was held not to be able to recover any of his additional costs.
Diamond v. United States, 98 Ct. CL 428, 1 CCF 457 (1943).
29. Lonergan Mlfg. Co, ASBCA No. 1601 (1954); Remler Co., Ltd, ASBCA No. 1113
(1953).
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might be held to have acquiesced in the decision of the contracting of-
ficer and be denied any recovery for a change.80
Oral Change Order
If the contracting officer orders a change orally, the contractor should
use his best efforts to obtain the order in writing. The "Changes" article
specifically provides that the order be written. The contractor should
again be careful to protect his rights by filing a written protest before
performing the changed work.
Judicial Relief
Where the contractor performs changed work ordered orally by the
contracting officer and seeks to recover on the basis of that oral order,
he is not without possible relief. In many court cases statements are
found that a contractor cannot recover additional costs for changes
predicated on the oral direction of the contracting officer. The authority
for such statements is frequently the following quotatior4 from Plumley
v. United States:3'
"There was a total failure to comply with these provisions, and though it may be
a hard case since the court found that the work was in fact extra and of considerable
value, yet Plumley cannot recover for that which, though extra, was not ordered by
the Officer and in the manner required by the contract."
The language of the Supreme Court indicates it found in fact that neither
an oral nor written order had been issued by the officer authorized in
the contract to direct a change. Hence, the facts in the Plumley case are
clearly distinguishable from the situation where the contracting officer
issues an oral change order under the current "Changes" article. Under
the Plumley facts recovery could not be had under any legal theory.
On occasion courts have granted contractors relief when they have
complied with oral orders of contracting officers but the basis for grant-
ing such relief is not entirely clear. In Ford v. United States"' the Court
of Claims reviewed earlier cases on the point and discussed waiver, im-
plied contracts, and ratification. A weakness in the waiver theory is
evident from that discussion. In that case the court indicated that there
could have been a waiver of the written order requirement by the con-
tracting officer since no limitation had been placed upon his discretion
as to the form of contract to be used. Such discretion in the contracting
officer is not present today. In accordance with established policy and
30. Fleisher Engineering & Construction Co. v. United States, 98 Ct. CI. 139 (1942);
Silberblatt & Lasker, Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct. CI. 54, 2 CCF 253 (1944).
31. 226 U.S. 545 (1913).
32. 17 Ct. Cl. 60 (1881).
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regulations, he must use Form 23, which contains the "Changes" article
that requires a change order to be in writing. He has no authority to
deviate from the provisions of the "Changes" article without approval
of certain higher authorities. Furthermore, if the written notice require-
ment is considered waived, then recovery should be permitted for what-
ever extra costs a contractor might incur in performing in acccordance
with the oral order even if at the time performance is terminated no
benefit had yet been received by the Government. No court, however,
has permitted recovery unless the Government has received a benefit from
performance pursuant to the oral order.33
A better basis for granting such relief might be the theory of implied
contract when the necessary factual background is present. As pointed
out above, a contract has been implied in fact where there has been
performance under an oral contract even though such contract was re-
quired by statute to be in writing.34 A change order lacking formal
documentation appears to be less seriously defective than an oral con-
tract which fails to comply with the statutory requirement that it be in
writing.
W. H. Armstrong & Co. v. United States3" is frequently cited as au-
thority for holding that compliance with an oral order of the contracting
officer is compensable on the basis of a contract implied in fact. The
decision by the Court of Claims in that case was by a 3 to 2 vote. Two
of the judges in the majority found that when the contracting officer
orally directed the contractor to do the extra work and promised it an
adjustment when the work was completed and the fair amount deter-
mined, and when the direction was followed by the contractor, a contract
to pay the contractor the reasonable cost of the work resulted. These
two judges based their finding on the "Extras" article in the contract,
33. W. H. Armstrong & Co. v. United States, 98 Ct. CL 519, 1 CCF 463 (1943). In
Morgan v. United States, 59 Ct. C1. 650 (1924), compliance with an oral order was being
made when the changed procedure was abandoned. The contractor was finally paid for
changed work completed but was not paid for materials and a machine on band which
were acquired solely for use in connection with the changed procedure and could not be
used on any other work of the contractor. The Court of Clahms cited the Plumley case
for its conclusion that the contractor could not be paid "damages" sustained by reason of
the abandonment of the changed procedure. The court pointed out that the contractor's
proper course was to insist that he be directed in writing before he performed the changed
work. Recently in R. M. Hollingshead Corporation v. United States, Ct. CL No. 11944
(Dec. 6, 1955) (not yet reported), the court ruled that if the contractor proved that the
Government orally promised to issue a change order, with appropriate price increase, sub-
stituting a more expensive component in place of one which had become unavailable, the
contractor would be entitled to a judgment because of refusal of the Government, after
the work was done, to issue a written change order.
34. See note 10 supra.
35. 98 Ct. Cl. 519, 1 CCF 468 (1943).
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which, like the current "Changes" article, merely required the order of
the contracting officer to be in writing and in that respect was unlike the
standard form of the "Changes" article then in use which also required
the written approval of the change order by the head of the department.
A third judge found in the contractor's favor on a breach of contract
theory, namely, that the Government did not permit the contractor to
perform the contract as he had agreed in writing. The judges who fol-
lowed the implied contract theory recognized that their conclusion was
contrary to the Plumley case, which they considered to stand alone.
They also pointed out that their conclusion was consistent with the
Court of Claims' prior decision in Grifiths v. United States,80 wherein no
mention was made of the Plumley case. The third judge wrote that if
either the "Changes" or "Extras" article applied he would conclude that
the Plumley case would govern. The two dissenting judges held that a
change was involved and since the approval of the head of the depart-
ment was not obtained, as required by the "Changes" article in the con-
tract, and since no written order had been issued, recovery should have
been denied. The dissenting judges cited the Plumley case in support
of their conclusion.
More recently, under somewhat similar facts in Globe Indemnity Co.
v. United States 7 the contractor was denied relief when the two dis-
senting judges in the Armstrong case were joined by a judge, recalled
from retirement, to form the majority in denying relief on the basis of
the Plumley decision. The two judges who granted relief on the theory
of implied contract in the Armstrong case concurred in result, since they
were willing to accept the contracting officer's finding that the contractor,
in performing the alleged changed work, was doing no more than what
the original contract required him to do. The third judge in the majority
of the Armstrong decision did not participate. In this case the contractor
never specifically requested a change order. At a conference a Govern-
ment agent told the contractor to do the work later claimed to be a
change and then to make up a proposal for his added cost. After the
contractor did so, the claim was rejected as "not legally allowable." The
"Changes" article had the requirement not in the current "Changes"
36. 77 Ct. Cl. 542 (1933). In this case the contracting officer refused to Issue an order
to allow payment for alleged extra grading and filling, holding that such work was required
under the specifications. The Court of Claims found that the extra work resulted from a
change. The Court did not discuss any theory of recovery but merely made the general
statement that the contractor was entitled to recover the actual cost of the extra grading
and filling. Since the contracing officer refused to issue any order, recovery could more
properly have been on the basis of damages for breach of contract than a contract Implied
in fact.
37. 102 Ct. Cl. 21, 2 CCF 584 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 852 (1945).
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article, that the approval of the head of the department be obtained for
any change involving an estimated increase of $500. Such approval was
not obtained although the change amounted to more than that sum. The
dissenters disagreed with the decision of the majority in so far as it
denied relief for failure to comply with technical requirements, and cited
the Armstrong decision in support of their view.
The majority of the court in the Globe Indemnity case stated that it
was a hardship case in which the court was powerless to give relief be-
cause of the contractor's failure to insist on compliance with the plain
provisions of the contract relative to changes. They further advised
contractors that they must study their contracts and insist on compliance
with their terms, and before relying on any promise they should ascertain
that it is made by a person having the authority to make such promise.
Advice was directed not only to contractors. The opinion of the majority
was critical of the head of the department for not having ratified the
unauthorized acts since the work was necessary and beneficial to the
Government. The majority said that contracting officers and heads of
departments should exercise the great powers conferred on them by these
contracts "to do equity" and should not feel under obligation to take
advantage of technicalities where to do so would defeat justice.
The United States Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari
in the Globe Indemnity case. It should be observed that in this case
there was the issue of the lack of the department head's approval, as
well as the absence of a written order, both of which were required by
the article. It is doubted that the court's decision would have been dif-
ferent if the first issue had not been present. In the future, however,
when a court considers an oral change order by the contracting officer
under the present "Changes" article, which does not require the ap-
proval of the head of the department, these older decisions might be dis-
tinguishable in this regard and not followed. The contract-implied-in-
fact theory might there be advanced with success.
In Stiers v. United States,3 by a unanimous decision, the Court of
Claims determined that a contractor could recover on oral promises on
the basis of a contract implied in fact and cited the Armstrong and
Griffits cases. The court said that the contractor should be compen-
sated for the additional costs incurred and services rendered at the re-
quest and for the benefit of the Government.
The decisions of the courts, when recovery has been requested on the
basis of an oral change order, are not too encouraging to contractors.
When the Court of Claims has granted relief it appears to have desired
to avoid a harsh and unjust result without undue emphasis being given
to the niceties of legal theories.
38. 121 Ct. C1. 157 (1951).
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Administrative Relief
Remembering the admonition of the majority of the court in the
Globe Indemnity case that though the Court of Claims was powerless to
give relief the head of the department could have done so, we now pass
to the consideration of the relief a contractor might obtain from the head
of the department where the contracting officer has refused to issue a
change order or has issued only an oral order.
The contractor presents his appeal for relief in such a situation to the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, to the Department of In-
terior Board of Contract Appeals, or to the Corps of Engineers Claims
and Appeals Board, who act as the alter ego of the head of the depart-
ment. These Boards are the authorized representatives of the heads of
their departments, as will be discussed more fully later, and are given
the contractual responsibility of deciding factual disputes between the
contracting officers and contractors. In addition, they also take certain
action on an administrative level to correct mistakes of contracting of-
ficers where relief under the contract is justified. As was said by the
Court of Claims in McWilliams Dredging Co. v. United States,"0 the
Board, as the representative of the head of the department, is like the
owner of a business who would reverse his agent if he were wrong, not be-
cause the contract gave him the authority to make a final decision but be-
cause it would be the natural and fair way for an owner to act.40 These
Boards, upon finding that under the facts of the particular case the con-
tracting officer should have issued a written change order, will, as an ad-
ministrative matter, return the appeal file to him with directions to issue
such an order and to grant any relief due under it.4' Thus it is that where
the contractor relies on an oral change order he may be able to obtain
relief before one of these Boards that might not be obtainable from the
courts.
Scope of Change Order
The next important consideration is that of the scope of the change
order. The "Changes" article permits the order to include "changes in
the drawings and/or specifications of this contract and within the general
scope thereof."
A caveat should be issued with regard to the application of Article 2 of
39. 118 Ct. CI. 1 (1950).
40. The case of Rappoli Co. v. United States, 98 Ct. CI. 499, 1 CCF 461 (1943), Is also
frequently cited for the proposition that mistakes should be corrected within the agency
whenever possible.
41. Harding, ASBCA No. 2477 (1955); Benjamin & Fleming, ASBCA No. 219 (1950);
Thomas C. Brown Co., W.D.BCA No. 308, 1 CCF 736 (1943); Ryall Engineering Co,
I.BCA 1, 6 CCF, par. 61,639 (1955).
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Standard Form 23, entitled "Specifications and Drawings." That article
provides that anything mentioned in the specifications and not shown on
the drawings or shown on the drawings and not mentioned in the speci-
fications shall be of like effect as if shown or mentioned in both. An
order to include anything in the drawings that is shown only in the
specifications or to include anything in the specifications that is shown
only on the drawings does not constitute a change under the "Changes"
article. Such an order merely puts into effect the application of Article
2. The article also provides that in case of a difference between the
drawings and specifications, the specifications shall govern. Hence, an
order that changes the drawings and thereby makes them consistent with
the specifications is similarly not a change under the "Changes" article.'
Attention should also be called to the rule of construction that any
ambiguity will be construed against the party who drafted the instru-
ment. The Government prepares the specifications and drawings. If a
contractor is ordered to do work he had not contemplated performing
because of an ambiguous specification or drawing, he will be entitled
to recover on the basis of a change. Another point to remember is that
a sovereign act of the Government does not constitute a compensable
change.45
A frequently quoted definition of the proper scope of a change order
is the following statement in General Contracting Co. v. United States:40
"Article 3 of the contract is a standard form used by the Goverment in all con-
struction contracts. Its purpose is to enable the contracting officer to make any
change in drawings and specifications he may find necessary or desirable as work
under the contract progresses. It has reference, we think, entirely to structural
changes like the substitution of one kind of material for another, changes in architec-
tural design, the addition to or subtraction from work required by the specifications,
etc."
In United States v. Rice,"7 the Supreme Court held that only struc-
tural changes come within the "Changes" article. However, not all struc-
42. Con Structors, ASBCA No. 1499 (1954); Tokheim Oil Tank and Pump Co.,
ASBCA No. 1597 (1953) (fittings shown in specifications but not on drawings, deleted,
held to be a change); Charles B. Johnson & Son, Inc., W.D.BCA No. 934, 3 CCF 461
(1945); John 0. Burgwin & Co., W.D.BCA No. 582, 2 CCF 780 (1944).
43. John B. Gutmann, W.D.BCA No. 534, 2 CCF 958 (1944); Patti-lfacDonald-Man-
hattan, Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals (hereinafter
referred to as C & A) Board No. 174 (1950).
44. Octagon Process, Inc., ASBCA No. 616, 5 CCF, par. 61,236 (1951); Busch & Latta
Painting Co., A.BCA No. 1756 (1948); Coupe Construction Co, W.D.BCA No. 1348 (1946).
45. Ottinger Bros, W.D.BCA No. 805, 3 CCF 236 (1945); Mf. E. Souther, Inc.,
W.D.BCA No. 915, 3 CCF 477 (1945).
46. 84 Ct. CI. 570, 579 (1937).
47. 317 U.S. 61, 1 CCF 396 (1942).
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tural changes are permitted within that article. There is the further re-
quirement that the structural change must be within the general scope
of the contract. The Supreme Court has defined this requirement in
Freund v. United States48 as meaning "what should be regarded as hav-
ing been fairly and reasonably within the contemplation of the parties
when the contract was entered into." Recently, in holding that changes
were within the general scope of the contract, the Court of Claims said:
"Although the changes were extensive, they were not so extensive as to be a
cardinal change."
49
The point at which the Government might exceed what is within the
general scope of the contract in the issuance of a change order is to a
large extent a matter of degree. The elimination of a building, with a
reduction in price of $99,520, where the original contract was for the
construction of certain hospital buildings and utilities at a cost of $911,-
376, was held to be a cardinal change which could not be accomplished
under the "Changes" article but only by the consent of both parties to
the contract. 50 In another case pile foundations could not be ordered
as a change in the place of reinforced concrete footings resting on soil.
The Court of Claims held, in considering those facts, that the "Changes"
article permitted only changes in the details shown by the drawings and
specifications and not such a fundamental change as required by an en-
tirely new kind of foundation. 1 In so holding the court recognized that
it was giving a narrow construction to the word "specifications," and that
the word is sometimes used in a broad sense with reference to anything
required by the contract. A post office was originally designed to be
faced with bluestone below the level of the first floor and with split-face
granite above the first floor level and was to cost $330,000. The ma-
terials were later changed to rubble or field stone and certain bluestone,
for which change the contractor was to be paid $30,393.33. The Court of
48. 260 U.S. 60 (1922).
49. F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. C1. 501, 130 F. Supp. 394 (1955).
In construing the scope of a contract, the courts are not so much concerned about the
mere number of change orders issued as they are with their substance. In Magoba Con-
struction Co. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 662, 1 CCF 611 (1943), the 62 change orders
issued during performance were held not to be an abuse. In Great Lakes Construction
Co. v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 479 (1942) some 700 additions and corrections were made
in the plans and specifications for the construction of a Federal prison to cost $2,781,000,
which were incorporated in 109 changes, and yet no abuse was found.
50. General Contracting Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. CI. 570 (1937).
51. Stapleton Construction Co. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 551 (1940). Order that
foundation be placed on piles was held to be beyond scope of "Changes" article in Sobel
v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 149 (1938), and the contractor was permitted to recover his
incidental costs and damages resulting from the delay occasioned by the change In the
foundation even though he accepted the change order.
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Claims held the change to be merely from one character of stone to another
and within the general scope of the contract.5 2 The court's decision in this
latter case appears to take a broader view of what can be done within the
scope of the contract than the opinion expressed in the previous case
where the court restricted the scope of a change order to specification
details and frowned on a change in materials.
On occasion the Boards of Contract Appeals have specifically said that
only structural changes may be made under the "Changes" article. 3
They have held, on the authority of General Contracting Co. v. United
States, that the requirement that guards be provided at certain times
could not be deleted from the specifications with a reduction in the con-
tract price under the "Changes" article. 4 Yet, in another case, after
calling attention to the above decision and also stating that only struc-
tural changes come within the "Changes" article, it was held that an
acceleration order did come 'within the "Changes" article.a That was
giving a broad meaning to "structural" change as well as to the word
"specifications."
A study of the decisions of Boards of Contract Appeals indicates that
such Boards have quite frequently given a broad meaning to those words.
Orders requiring stoppage of work at certain times on certain days were
held to come within the "Changes" article. 0 A stop order issued to vary
the schedule of performance contained in the specifications has also been
said to be within the "Changes" article. 7 Relief was granted under the
"Changes" article where the specifications provided that work need not
be performed when the ground was "frozen beyond workability" and
the contracting officer "suggested" that work be continued when the
ground was so frozen, which necessitated the rental and use of equip-
ment that would not otherwise have been required. s The direction to
laminate lumber in order to provide the large members not obtainable
52. Silberblatt & Lasker, Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct. CL 54 (1944). In Schneider v.
United States, 19 Ct. CL 547 (1884), a contract for sandstone could not be changed to
provide marble without readvertising.
53. Swords-McDougal Co., W.D.BCA No. 533, 3 CCF 23S (1944); Sanders, A.BCA
No. 1468, 4 CCF, par. 60,526 (1949).
54. J. Emil Anderson & Sons, Inc., W.D.BCA No. 543, 2 CCF 757 (1944).
55. Sanders, A.CA No. 1468, 4 CCF, par. 60,526 (1948). An order to work personnel
overtime has been held to constitute a change. C. H. Everitt, Inc., W.D.BCA No. 335, 2
CCF 629 (1944).
56. Schaefer, ASBCA No. 917 (1952).
57. See Guthrie Electrical Construction, I.BCA No. 22, 6 CCF, par. 61,637. A stop order
issued because of doubts concerning the availability of an appropriation was held to have
led to changes in the work for which the contractor should have been compensated under
the "Changes" article.
58. Bauer Bros. Construction & Supply Co., A.BCA No. 1694 (1949).
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from the sources specified in the contract was held to be a change."
Similarly, a compensable change was found where the Government was
unable to fulfill its contractual obligation to provide lumber and nails
and the contractor was directed to do so.00 In another appeal 1 the con-
tractor protested before performing in accordance with an order of the
contracting officer that he repair items damaged in shipment. The Board
found that such repair work was not required by the contract and that
it constituted a change which affected the cost of the performance of
the contract. It directed that a formal change order be issued to confirm
the instructions to accomplish the repair work. In making that direction
the Board called attention to the Globe Indemnity case. On review,
under lump sum contracts where the contract prices were based on
estimated quantities and substantial overruns and underruns developed,
change orders were directed to be issued.02 Months after completion of
a contract in accordance with the specifications, the contracting officer
directed that the work be modified in accordance with new specifications.
The Board found that a change order should have been issued.03
The Comptroller General also appears to be liberal in applying the
"Changes" article. He has ruled that where wage rates obsolete prior to
advertising and award were inadvertently included in a construction
contract pursuant to the Davis-Bacon Act, the proper rates should be
incorporated into the contract by a change order.0 4
Extra work that must be performed because of faulty specifications or
of errors by the contracting officer has been held to come within the
59. McIntyre, W.D.BCA No. 1035, 3 CCF 1081 (1945).
60. Robert M. Lee, W.D.BCA No. 610, 2 CCF 1029 (1944). Order to rebuild access
roads where originally Government was required to provide such roads and the contrac-
tor to maintain them was held to come within the "Changes" article. Langenfelder,
W.D.BCA No. 706, 2 CCF 1071 (1944).
61. Gennett & Sons, Inc., ASBCA No. 743 (1951).
62. Ottinger Bros., W.D.BCA No. 584, 2 CCF 982 (1944); Royals, A.BCA Nos, 1715
and 1727 (1949). The contractor consented to the application of the "Changes" article
where 36 barracks of the 107 contemplated to be built under the contract were deleted.
Randall Construction Co., W.D.BCA No. 404, 2 CCF 752 (1944). A substantial variance
was found and a change ordered where 5,280 cubic yards of fill had to be hauled and placed
instead of the estimated 2,800 cubic yards and 659 cubic yards of improved gravel had
to be used instead of the estimated 400 cubic yards. Brezner, ASBCA No. 1187 (1953).
A material difference was not found to exist where fill placed was only 15,836 cubic yards
less than the 732,000 cubic yards estimated in the specifications. The change order which
decreased the contract price to compensate for the lesser amount of fill placed was held
not to come within the "Changes" article. Ben C. Gerwick, Inc., ASBCA No. 368 (1950).
63. Corey, A.BCA No. 1814, 4 CCF, par. 60,572 (1948).
64. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-106987, May 8, 1953, 6 CCF, par. 61,482. Bridgeman Con-
struction Co., W.D.BCA No. 838 (1945) is to the same effect.
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"Changes" article." On the other hand, errors made by a contractor in
his bid cannot be corrected by a change order.o
The broad construction given by the Boards of Contract Appeals to
the scope of the "Changes" article should not mislead contractors to be-
lieve that all orders by contracting officers which affect performance
come within that article. It has been held not to apply where the work
ordered is incidental to the required performance under the contract.
Aerating of material was held to be incidental to the required prepara-
tion of a subbase.6 7 A contractor's request for a change order because
Government inspectors required him to comply strictly with the contract
specifications was denied as being without merit. 8 Where a certain re-
sult is required by the contract, the contractor must use any available
means to accomplish that result. The statement by the contracting of-
ficer that sandblasting was the only effective means to remove mill scale
from tanks to make them clean did not result in a change for which the con-
tractor could be paid the cost of sandblasting.69 Nor was an order to
install a gradation control unit, which was necessary to acquire a proper
mix of aggregate, within the "Changes" article.70 An order to work dur-
ing inclement weather, including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, in
order to maintain the contract progress schedule, could not qualify as
a contractual change.71 Where the specifications provided that the work
would be done as directed by the contracting officer, the contractor was
not entitled to a change under the contract when the contracting officer
directed that he employ a different method of applying sheathing than
the one which he had intended to use.7' An order to remove and replace
a defective base course before acceptance of the work did not qualify
as a change where the contractor had responsibility for the work per-
formed prior to final acceptance. 3
65. Bolef, ASBCA No. 1922 (1954); Allen-Morrison Sign Co., W.D.BCA No. 1073,
3 CCF 992 (1945); Stephens-Brown, Inc., W.).BCA Nos. 852 and 902, 3 CCF 431 (1945);
Pfotzer, W.DLBCA No. 113, 1 CCF 230 (1943).
66. S. N. Nielsen Co., ASBCA No. 1990 (1954); Trio Machine Products, ASBCA No.
1S17 (1954); United States Air Conditioning Corp., ASBCA No. 1118 (1952); Reed Re-
search, Inc., ASBCA No. 1073 (1952).
67. Hargrave, W.D.BCA No. 804, 3 CCF 1113 (1945). On further appeal on other
claims, recovery was denied in Hargrave v. United States, - CL CL -, 130 F. Supp. 595
(1955).
6S. Penker Associates, Inc, W.D.BCA Nos. 779 and 821, 3 CCF 117 (1944).
69. McCloskey & Co, W.D.BCA No. 559, 3 CCF 835 (1945).
70. Southern Construction Co, W.D.BCA No. 899, 3 CCF 890 (1945).
71. Green, W.D.BCA No. 230, 1 CCF 838 (1943).
72. Insulating Products Corp., W.D.BCA No. 282, 1 CCF 853 (1943). Similarly,
Florence, W.D.BCA No. 1159 (1945).
73. J. A. Ross Co., W.D.BCA No. 1239 (1947), aft'd, 126 Ct. Cl. 323, 115 F. Supp. 187
(1953).
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These decisions appear to warrant the conclusion that the Boards, on
many occasions, have given a broad construction to the word "specifica-
tions" so as to include anything required by the contract. It might be
more realistic and accurate to modify the "Changes" article to authorize
specifically any change in the requirements of the contract within the
general scope thereof instead of merely providing for changes in the
drawings and/or specifications. The "Changed Conditions" article 4
was recently modified to substitute "contract" for "drawings or specifica-
tions" in one instance and in another "contract" for "plans and speci-
fications."
Lengthy discussion might be had as to what changes are or are not
within the scope of the contract. Extensive discussion herein, however,
is not warranted. No hard and fast rule can be given. The standard
adopted in one case would probably not apply to the next one. The
complex Government project should be broken down to its simplest ele-
ments in an endeavor to answer the question. Clearly, under the
"Changes" article a carpenter who has a contract to build a frame build-
ing cannot be ordered to construct one of marble. Nor can he be asked
to build one of stone, probably not one of brick, and when asked to
change the siding of the building from clapboard to slate shingle there
might be doubt, but if directed to change the siding from clapboard to
wood shingle the change would come within the "Changes" article. The
nature and the amount of the original work must be considered as well
as the character and resources of the contractor.
Time for Making Adjustment
When the contracting officer issues the change order he may not be in
a position to make a reasonable estimate of the effect it will have on
performance. As a result, in many cases he does not attempt at the time
of issuing the change order to make a final compensating adjustment for
the change. The Court of Claims has indicated that under certain cir-
cumstances the determination of costs could be deferred until the con-
clusion of performance, when the costs can be accurately computed."
Government policy is definitely against such after-the-fact pricing
under change orders. In 1954, meetings were held between representa-
tives of the Government and contractors to plan procedures for the ex-
peditious processing of change orders. As a result of such meetings and
an exchange of correspondence between a representative of the As-
sociated General Contractors of America, Inc., and representatives of the
74. Article 4 of Standard Form 23A, General Provisions (Construction Contracts).
75. W. H. Armstrong & Co. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 519, 1 CCF 468 (1943); Whit-
man v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 464, 110 F. Supp. 444 (1953).
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Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, the Bureau of Yards and
Docks, Department of the Navy, and the Bureau of Reclamation, De-
partment of the Interior, certain conclusions can be drawn. They con-
cluded the general rule should be that the written change order setting
forth the changed work and the adjustment in price and time should be
issued before commencement of the changed work. Only where time is
not available and the changed work must proceed may the change be
initiated by a two-part change order. Part I will then set forth the
scope of the change and will state that the adjustment will be made at
an early date. A provision might also be included in Part I for progress
payments to be made on the basis of undisputed cost estimates. It is
contemplated that Part II of the change order will be issued as soon as
sufficient cost data become available to enable final prices to be de-
termined. In no event will after-the-fact pricing be allowed or ap-
proved.70 Both parties to the contract realize that it is to their interests
individually and mutually that delays in the issuance of final and com-
plete change orders be avoided.
Contractor's Notice of Claim
The "Changes" article requires that any claim by the contractor for
adjustment must be asserted in writing within 30 days from the date of
receipt by him of the notification of change. Contractors must be careful
to comply with these procedural requirements. The Court of Claims has
upheld a contracting officer's denial of an adjustment where the con-
tractor failed to present his claim within the time stated in the
"Changes" article. 7 The current "Changes" article requires the claim to
be asserted in writing, whereas such a requirement was not present in
the prior version of the article.
If the contractor fails to comply with the 30-day notice of claim
requirement, his situation is not always hopeless. The "Changes" article
expressly permits the contracting officer to receive, consider and adjust
any such claim at any time prior to the date of the final settlement of
the contract provided he determines that the facts justify such action.
The contracting officer's conduct in considering and passing on the
contractor's claim under those circumstances has generally been de-
scribed as a waiver of the thirty-day notice of claim requirement. Such
a waiver authorized by a contract provision should not be confused with
the waiver by the contracting officer of a contractual right of the Govern-
76. Progress Report, Nov. 1955, "Processing Change Orders and Disputes on Federal
Construction Contracts," The Associated General Contractors of America, Inc.
77. Shepherd v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl. 724, 113 F. Supp. 648 (1953). See also, Kirlr
WXDXLCA No. 1, 1 CCF 67 (1943).
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ment. They are not comparable and have different legal status. The
contracting officer waived the notice of claim requirement where he
considered a late claim without any mention of the delinquency.7 8
The contract does not define the facts that justify waiver of the thirty-
day notice of claim requirement. The purpose of the requirement has
been stated to be the protection of the Government against delays which
are injurious to its interest. If the delay is not prejudicial to the Govern-
ment, the contracting officer probably will consider the claim. The War
Department Board of Contract Appeals held that the requirement should
be waived where evidence is available to determine the merits of the
claim.79 There the Board said that the contracting officer, in dismissing
the claim for not having been timely presented, was merely adhering to
the letter but not to the reason for the requirement.
Another area of uncertainty concerns the time within which the con-
tracting officer may waive the thirty-day notice of claim requirement.
The "Changes" article provides that prior to the date of the final settle-
ment this may be done for justifiable cause.
What constitutes "final settlement" is not definite. In recent years a
broad construction has been given to it. Mere completion of work and
full payment of contract price are not enough. As long as a binding
release or an accord and satisfaction was not executed in connection with
final payment, it has been held that the contract has not been finally
settled.80 Through a long line of cases, from its organization in 1942
78. Arundel Corp. v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 77 (1942).
79. Sanders, W.D.BCA No. 955, 3 CCF 862 (1945); original decision amended on an-
other point, 3 CCF 923 (1945). A court might be hesitant to hold that the contracting
officer was in error in not considering a late claim unless it finds that he abused the dis-
cretion given to him by the contract.
80. Boyd Contracting Co., ASBCA No. 1504 (1953); Production Line Manufacturers,
Inc., ASBCA No. 816, 5 CCF, par. 61,334 (1951); Menihan, A.BCA No. 1759, 4 CCF,
par. 60,581. See Harrison Engineering & Construction Corp. v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl.
205, 68 F. Supp. 350, 4 CCF par. 60,187 (1946). In Globe Indemnity Co. v. United States,
102 Ct. Cl. 21, 2 CCF 584 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 852 (1945), the check in payment
of the final voucher was endorsed by the contractor without any protest and no reserva-
tions of rights bad been made on the final voucher. Almost four months after final payment
the claim on the basis of the oral change order was asserted. The only reason the Court
of Claims gave for denying the claim was the failure to obtain a written order from the
contracting officer and the written approval of the change from the head of the depart-
ment. In another case under a supply contract the contractor made his final delivery and
received payment therefor in 1939. In 1950 the contractor filed a claim for payment under
the "Inspection" article of the contract for reasonable value of garments used by the
Government which had been rejected in 1939. The Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals held that it had jurisdiction to consider the claim on its merits. Conro Manufac-
turing Co., ASBCA No. 769 (1951). The Government withheld under 225 supply contracts
from amounts due to the contractor in accordance with the alleged rights of the Govern-
ment under the "Covenant Against Contingent Fees" provisions in those contracts. The
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until June 1946, the War Department Board of Contract Appeals ad-
hered to the principle that if a contract had been fully performed and
final payment had been made and accepted, without reservation, the con-
tract had been settled and was no longer an active contract for the pur-
pose of further negotiation or compensation. In Reed & Prince Mant-
facturing Co.,81 performance had been completed and final payment
made under documents which did not contain any release or reservation
by the parties. Thereafter the General Accounting Office took exception
to a payment that had been made for a change in the packing specifica-
tions. The contractor repaid the amount under protest and filed a claim
for the repayment. The Board sustained the appeal and specifically
stated that it was reversing its prior conflicting decision with regard to
the time at which final settlement-occurs.
The above construction of the time within which final settlement oc-
curs is not necessarily inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme
Court in Globe Indemnity Co. v. United States,'a decided in 1934. There
the Court construed the meaning of "final settlement" as used in a provi-
sion of the Heard Act, repealed in 1935. Under that provision a subcon-
tractor could sue on the performance bond of the contractor no later than
one year after "the performance and final settlement" of the contract.
The Court pointed out that the policy of the statute to afford protection
to the interests of laborers and materialmen would not be accomplished
unless the date of final settlement, which fixes the time within which suit
is permitted, could be ascertained with reasonable certainty and finality.
The Court held that the requirements of the Heard Act were met by the
determination, made by the administrative officer or department having
the contract in charge, that the contract had been completed and that the
final payment was due. The limited purpose of the definition is shown
by the Court's comment that such administrative "determination would
be 'final settlement' for purposes of the Heard Act if payment had pre-
ceded action by the Comptroller General. 8s3 The Supreme Court might
find on another occasion that the purpose for the use of the term "final
settlement" in the "Changes" article is not comparable to the purpose it
found in the Heard Act and conclude differently as to its meaning.
contractor contended that since final payment had been made under many of the contracts
and since Certificates of Settlement had been issued by the General Accounting Office on the
accounts of some of the disbursing officers who had made final payments under certain
of these contracts, the contracts were concluded and no action could be taken under them.
The contractor's jurisdictional motion was denied and the appeal was decided on its merits.
Metro Engineering & Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 1495, 6 CCF, par. 61,567 (1954).
81. W.D.BCA No. 1265, 4 CCF, par. 60,140 (1946).
82. 291 U.S. 476 (1934).
83. Id. at 484. The Act of Aug. 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 793, 40 U..C.A. 270-a, popularly
known as the Miller Act, superseded the Heard Act.
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Nature of Adjustment
Next we turn to the adjustment mentioned in the "Changes" article.
If the change causes an increase or decrease in the amount due under the
contract or in the time required for its performance, an equitable adjust-
ment is to be made and the contract modified in writing accordingly.
Only if the change causes certain results, an equitable adjustment is to be
made. Hence, the contractual right to an equitable adjustment will de-
pend upon proof by the claimant that the change did cause the results
he asserts. Proof, therefore, is very important in obtaining an equitable
adjustment.
As a rule, contractors and contracting officers are able to negotiate
satisfactorily as to the time increase or decrease that resulted from the
change. Unlike the money factor, the time factor of an equitable adjust-
ment does not present complex problems.
Any study of the money factor to be included in an equitable adjust-
ment begins with United States v. Callahan Walker Const. Co.,8 decided
in 1942. There the Supreme Court stated that the equitable adjustment
for building a berm not originally required by the specifications merely
involved "the ascertainment of the cost of digging, moving, and placing
earth, and the addition to that cost of a reasonable and customary al-
lowance for profit."
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rice,85 rendered on
the same day as that in the above case, further refines the meaning of
equitable adjustment. In this case the contractor was required to install
certain equipment in a building to be constructed by another contractor.
The Government made a number of changes in the construction contract,
as a result of which the equipment contractor was unable to install equip-
ment as planned. The Government granted him an extension of time for
delay but refused to compensate for overhead expenses which accumu-
lated during the delay and for decreased labor effectiveness resulting from
84. 317 U.S. 56, 1 CCF 396 (1942).
85. 317 U.S. 61, 1 CCF 396 (1942). In the report of this decision in 1 CCF at page 398,
in the first paragraph of the column on the right hand side of the page, beginning with the
thirteenth line after the word "consequential," which ends the twelfth line, a very serious
printing error was made. The error consists of the inclusion of the following language
which does not appear in 317 U.S.: ". . . changes in cost due to the structural changes re-
quired by the altered specification and not to consequential ... ." Many times the Court's
language has been quoted by using the 1 CCF report with the error. Hereinafter an exact
quotation is made from 317 U.S. In a few cases shortly after the Rice case was decided
by the Supreme Court, the War Department Board of Contract Appeals, in following It,
said that indirect costs could not be allowed a contractor for a change as a result of that
decision. See Ironall Factories Co., W.D.BCA No. 320, 1 CCF 761 (1943). The Boards have
stated that they must follow the Rice doctrine even though that decision has been criticized.
Sanders, A.BCA No. 1468, 4 CCF, par. 60,526 (1949).
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performance of outdoor work in the winter rather than in warm weather
as originally contemplated. In so deciding the Supreme Court made the
oft-quoted statement:
".... for 'increase or decrease of cost' plainly applies to the changes in cost due to
the structural changes required by the altered specification and not to consequential
damages which might flow from delay taken care of in the 'difference in time' pro-
vision."
The Supreme Court explained its decision in the Rice case by giv-
ing this simple example. If an alteration in the specifications re-
quired the contractor to use an extra 50 tons of steel, the Government
would be liable for the value of the steel and the cost of its installation,
but an extension of time must be accepted as full equitable adjustment
for all damages caused by the fact that the work was done at a later
period made necessary by the ordered change. No allowance or provi-
sion is made for any increase in the cost of the work not changed.8
Whenever the term, "consequential damages," is mentioned in a
Government contract, many lawyers immediately associate it with the
Rice case and with disallowance of cost for delay. This phenomenon led
to a flood of appeals under a Government-furnished property article
which provided that an equitable adjustment would be granted for delay
in delivering Government-furnished property but such an adjustment
would not include consequential damages or loss of profit. Some con-
tracting officers decided that no adjustment in contract price was per-
mitted for such delay since in the Rice case the Supreme Court held that
damages resulting from delay were consequential. In pointing out the
falacy of that reasoning the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals,
in Carteret Work Uniforms,s7 went back to Hadley v. Baxendale,8s and
86. The contractor was delayed in ordering special steel rails because of a change order.
During the delay the price of steel advanced, with a resulting increase in the cost of the
special steel rails. The change order did not affect that part of the work involving the
special steel rails. The Board held that the issuance of a change order whereby the un-
changed work was delayed was not tantamount to the issuance of a change order as to the
unchanged work. Therefore, the adjustment claim for the special steel rails on the basis
of a change order was denied. Gerwick, ASBCA No. 158, 5 CCF, par. 61,461 (1953). See
also, Charles H. Tompkins Co., ASBCA No. 306 (1950); Gardner Displays Co, ASBCA
No. 1598 (1954).
87. ASBCA No. 1015 (1952). The Board said that what may be consequential damages
under one article are not necessarily consequential damages under another. When an
equitable adjustment is permitted for a change, it is different from permitting an equitable
adjustment for delay by the Government. In the first case delay caused by the Govern-
ment is consequential under the Rice case but in the second situation it is the direct cause
for which damages are to be paid. For the allowance of specific costs directly resulting
from delay in delivering Government-furnished property, see Carteret Work Uniforms,
ASBCA No. 1647, 6 CCF, par. 61,561 (1954).
88. 9 Ex. 341, 186 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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gave consideration to the differences between direct or general damages,
on the one hand, and consequential or special damages, on the other.
The distinction between the two groups is not absolute but relative, de-
pending upon the facts of the particular case. Those damages which
flow naturally and according to the usual course of things as the result
of the change may be classified as direct damages from the change.
Any other damages that result from the change would be incidental or
consequential. In the language of the Rice case, the natural or direct
damages resulting from the change are properly part of the equitable
adjustment.
The result of the Rice decision has been criticized for causing con-
tractors to increase their bids to cover the possibility that perform-
ance might have to be accomplished under the most adverse conditions
which may reasonably be expected to occur during any part of the year
in the place where the work is to be performed.8 9
The reference to direct damages as being a proper part of an equitable
adjustment should not be confused in discussing the types of costs that
might be included. Direct costs, such as labor and material, as well as
such indirect costs as factory burden and general and administrative,
are included in the equitable adjustment as long as they flow directly
from the change.
Two types of adjustments may be required to compensate for direct
damages resulting from change orders. The first relates to work per-
formed or commitments made prior to the issuance of the change order,
as where the contractor has purchased machinery or materials or has
work in process which the change order makes unusable, or has entered
into subcontracts which the change order makes it necessary to cancel.
The contractor's claim for such costs is similar in nature to a claim re-
lating to the uncompleted portion of a contract terminated by the Gov-
ernment for its convenience. The methods and procedures of the ap-
plicable termination regulations may be used as a guide in determining
that type of adjustment and in disposing of unusable material 0 This
type of adjustment may be made by a lump sum payment or credit. The
second type of adjustment relates to the work performed on the re-
mainder of the contract. The change order may have the effect of in-
creasing or decreasing the contractor's cost with respect to the remain-
ing work. Such an adjustment may be taken care of by an increase
or decrease in contract unit prices.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has reviewed the
89. Anderson, "Changes, Changed Conditions and Extras in Government Contracting,"
42 III. L. Rev. 29 (1947).
90. ASPR 8-101, 32 Code Fed. Regs., § 407.101 (Supp. 1954), 2 CCH GCR, § 41,702.
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computation of an equitable adjustment where work had been deleted
after partial performance. The Board held that the contractor was en-
titled to be paid the direct costs of his performance on the deleted work,
plus an overhead allowance, plus profit." The resulting lump sum settle-
ment was added to the total contract price. A somewhat different ap-
proach was approved where the "Changes" article in the contract was
different from the current form and the contractor relied on the differ-
ence to justify the computation of the deduction to be made for a dele-
tion. The Board approved his computation, which was made by deduct-
ing his cost of the deleted work estimated at the time of the contract
plus six per cent profit from the contract price. 2 In another appeal0
the Board stated that where a change order involves the deletion of work
the Government is entitled to a credit for the direct costs of the un-
performed deleted work plus related overhead and anticipated profits.
The Board approved twenty-six per cent of direct labor and material
costs as the overhead and profit to be included in the amount of the de-
duction to be made as part of the equitable adjustment. That percentage
had been used by the contractor for a number of years in computing bids
on Government work. Since the Board found that the change order
was clear and concise and did not require any clarification, it refused
to accept as part of the equitable adjustment the cost of correspondence
written and conferences held pertaining to the equitable adjustment after
the execution of the change order. It also refused to include the cost
of the appeal as part of the adjustment.
In another appeal steel tubing which cost $.72 per unit was substituted
for aluminum which had a unit cost of $1.87 per unit. The Government
was clearly entitled to a credit on cost of materials of $1.15 per unit on such
a change. The contractor, however, showed that the labor cost of install-
91. Palmberg Construction Co., ASBCA No. 2155 (1954). In John T. Brady & Co,
W.D.BCA No. 303, 2 CCF 316 (1944), the Board stated that if the change reduced or
deleted the amount due under the contract, the Government was relieved from paying for
the amount reduced or deleted and was obligated to pay only to the contractor its actual
expenses incurr-d in connection with the item deleted, "this to include the cost of the direct
materials, direct labor expended thereon, cost of indirect materials used, the overhead and
general expenses directly applicable, plus a proportionate profit on the work actually done
in connection therewith prior to the deletion but not on the cost of the materials." The
Board feared that to allow profit on purchased materials would be to pay a profit on some-
thing which was not a benefit to the Government. That fear was not warranted. The
contractor acquired the purchased material for the benefit of the Government contract
by expending his own funds. For the use of that money he is entitled to be paid some
profit depending upon the effort required in purchasing the material and other circum-
stances. The Board admitted that if the deletion were a partial termination of the con-
tract, profit might have been payable on the purchased materials.
92. Chang, ASECA No. 1700 (1954).
93. C. H. Leavell & Co., ASBCA No. 2364 (1954).
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ing the steel tubing was in excess of the labor cost for using the alumi-
num. As a result, he received a credit for the increased labor cost as
part of the equitable adjustment for the change.94
A contractor's view of what was a proper equitable adjustment was
upheld in another case,95 where he successfully contended that the con-
tract price should not be reduced when a change order deleted the use
of waterproof Kraft wrapping paper which he already had purchased
and for which he had no use and was willing to give to the Government.
Under unit price contracts the Boards generally have held that the
equitable adjustment consists of the application of the unit price to the
portion actually completed. Contractors have argued against such a
rule on the ground that the price for the unit deleted was originally
computed to include a profit to balance the price of another unit bid at
a loss, 98 or that the deletion of the particular units did not proportion-
ately lower the remaining overhead expenses. 7 The answer given was
that the contractor made his bid with knowledge that changes might be
issued and, therefore, should have computed the individual unit prices to
include all indirect costs and a reasonable profit.
In a few situations, however, unit prices have not been accepted as
a fair basis for computing equitable adjustments where deletions have
been ordered. Under a construction contract where the unit prices were
based on estimated quantities, a Board has held that a deletion of eighty-
five per cent of one item of work was unreasonable and that the applica-
tion of the unit price to the work actually performed was not a proper
equitable adjustment. In place of the contractual unit price it allowed
the contractor his reasonable costs in performing the undeleted work,
including the indirect costs allocable to it plus a fair profit.9" The de-
letion was not unreasonable in relation to the performance required
under the entire contract. Those decisions indicate that the unit prices
will be used to compute the equitable adjustment only as long as the
hardhip, if any, is not too great. In another appeal where a contractor
in his bid made the prices contingent upon his obtaining all the work, and
such a conditioned bid was accepted, an equitable adjustment for deletion
of part of the work based on unit prices was held not proper.9 9 Where
the overhead remained constant regardless of the deletion of part of the
94. Pentagon Manufacturing, Inc., ASBCA No. 1711 (1954).
95. Godard, W.D.BCA No. 781, 3 CCF 23 (1944).
96. Camouflage Co., W.D.BCA No. 368, 1 CCF 906 (1943).
97. Randall Construction Co., W.D.BCA No. 404, 2 CCF 752 (1944).
98. Ottinger, W.D.BCA No. 584, 2 CCF 982 (1944).
99. Pintura General, SA., W.D.BCA No. 521, 2 CCF 725 (1944).
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work, the equitable adjustment for the deletion has been computed in
a few cases to include an allowance for part of such overhead.' °
If a contractor can show that the deletion constituted a partial ter-
mination of his contract for the convenience of the Government, he might
then be able to obtain, under the "Termination For Convenience Of The
Government" article, an increase in his prices for the continued portion
of the contract to compensate for continuing overhead or other hardships
resulting from the deletion. 1' Contingent claims are not included as part
of an equitable adjustment."0 2
In computing the cost of the work required by a change order, the
costs that will be reasonably experienced by the contractor should be
used.10 3 The costs of an experienced company should not be considered
as a standard where the contractor is a newcomer in the field and not
too efficient. The extent of a deletion in arriving at an equitable adjust-
ment should be based upon the work actually described in the con-
tract and should not depend upon what the contractor had been
told would be its scope even though he based his bid upon such informa-
tion.-04 In one case the contractor, in computing his bid for a lump sum
contract, estimated $34,800 as the cost for outside electrical work when
in fact through a mistake such amount reflected only the labor cost
without any allowance for material. After his bid was accepted the mis-
take was discovered. Subsequently, a change was ordered in the outside
electrical work. The contracting officer determined that because of such
change the contract price of $361,000 should be reduced by $41,510.
The contractor argued that an adjustment was not equitable where, as
a result of his mistake he, in effect, had to pay the Government $6,710
to do the outside electrical work. The Board affirmed the findings of the
contracting officer and said that a proper equitable adjustment was to
determine the reasonable cost of the work as originally required and the
reasonable cost of the work performed pursuant to the change and, since
the latter was the lesser of the two, to reduce the contract price by the
difference. 05
These decisions prove with certainty at least one conclusion, namely,
rigid rules to be followed under all circumstances in computing an
100. Ozark Dam Constructors, C. & A. No. 189 (1951). Further appeal on different
point in Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 130 Ct CI. 354, 127 F. Supp. 187
(1955). C. Ray Sykes Associates, Inc., C & A No. 504 (1953).
101. ASPR 8-703(i), 32 Code Fed. Regs, § 407.703 (Supp. 1954), 2 CCH GCR, § 41,863.
102. Lonergan Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 1601 (1954).
103. Dibs Production & Engineering Co, ASBCA No. 1438 (1954); Moser, W.D.BCA
Nos. 711 and 727, 2 CCF 1127 (1944).
104. Langoma Industries, Inc. v. United States, - Ct. CL -, 135 F. Supp. 282 (1955).
105. S. N. Nielsen Co., ASBCA No. 1990 (1954).
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equitable adjustment cannot be given. They probably are consistent
with the statement of the Court of Claims that the courts and adminis-
trative boards should equitably adjust any increase or decrease in costs,
depending upon the circumstances of the particular case.100
Acceptance of Change Order
When a change order is presented to a contractor he is asked fre-
quently to execute an acceptance thereof. If the order merely embodies
the change without making an equitable adjustment, the contractor's
acceptance has no effect upon his right to later claim an adjustment.
That result is reached because there is no consideration for such an
agreement. The contract specifically gives the contracting officer the
right to issue change orders under certain conditions and the contractor
has no choice as to performance.10 7
On the other hand, a contractor who accepts in writing, without condi-
tion or reservation, a change order which specifies the adjustment to be
made, cannot subsequently recover more on the ground that the adjust-
ment is inadequate. 08 Where the accepted change order contained
the statement that ".. . it is further understood and agreed that all
other terms and conditions of said contract shall be and remain the
same," the ordered work had to be performed at the unit contract price
for that type of work. In that same case another accepted change order
provided that there would be no "change in the contract cost." The con-
tractor accepted these orders upon the representation of the area engi-
neer that their acceptance would not jeopardize claims for extra com-
pensation for the work performed under the change orders. The Court
of Claims, upon finding that the area engineer had no authority to make
such an agreement, held that the contractor was bound in accordance
with the documents he accepted.'00 Such an accepted change order is
also binding against the Government." 0
Appeal
If the parties fail to agree on the adjustment to be made, the
"Changes" article provides that the contractor may appeal pursuant to
the "Disputes" article (Art. 6) of the contract. The Supreme Court has
106. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 119 Ct. C1. 504, 96 F. Supp.
923 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952).
107. Thompson v. United States, 91 Ct. C1. 166 (1940).
108. Irwin & Leighton v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 84 (1945); Sanders v. United
States, 104 Ct. C1. 1, 60 F. Supp. 483 (1945).
109. Hargrave v. United States, - Ct. CI. -, 130 F. Supp. 598 (1955).
110. DeKoning Construction Co., W.D.BCA No. 1423, 4 CCF, par. 60,358 (1947);
Kerby Saunders, Inc., W.D.BCA No. 865, 3 CCF 1079 (1945).
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said that the determination of an equitable adjustment presents inquiries
of fact and that the "Disputes" article provided the only avenue for
relief if the contracting officer erroneously answered such inquiries.11
The "Disputes" article covers appeals from decisions of contracting of-
ficers on disputes of fact. That article as it is now set out in Form 23
embodies the substance of Section 1 of Public Law 356, 83d Congress, 2d
Session, approved May 11, 1954.11
The contractor must appeal to the administrative board, such as the
Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals Board, the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals, or the Department of Interior Board of
Contract Appeals, on all disputes of fact before he can obtain a court
decision on such a dispute." 3 All appeals under the "Disputes" article
of the Department of Interior contracts must be taken to the Depart-
ment of Interior Board of Contract Appeals.' 4 All appeals pursuant to
the "Disputes" article in contracts of the Departments of the Navy and
Air Force must be taken to the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals.115
111. United States v. Callahan Walker Coast. Co., 317 US. 56 (1942).
112. 41 U.S.CA. § 321 (1954). This Act is frequently referred to as the "Anti-Wunder-
lich Legislation," since the reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Wunderlich, 342 US. 98 (1951) was the primary reason for its enactment. In substance,
the Act provides that the decision of the head of any department or his authorized repre-
sentative in a factual dispute shall not be final and conclusive if upon judicial review it is
found to be fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necearily to
imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence. The application of the Act
raises many questions that have not yet been answered. The background of the Act is dis-
cussed in Cuneo, "The Contracting Officer and the Wunderlich Remedial Legidation," Pro-
curement Legal Service, Department of the Army, 8/1954, p. 10.
113. The contractor must first exhaust his administrative remedy. United States v.
Holpuch Co., 32S US. 234 (1946); United States v. Blair, 321 US. 730 (1944).
114. The LBCA was established by Order No. 2509, Amendment No. 22, effective
December 31, 1954. The order and rules of procedure of the I.BCA are set forth in 43 Code
Fed. Regs. 4.1-4.16 and 1 CCH GCR, par. 10,76S.
115. The ASBCA was created by the joint directive of the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy and Air Force, effective as of Mray 1, 1949. Its Charter is Part I of Appendix A
of ASPR (32 Code Fed. Regs., § 415a.1; 1A CCH GCR, par. 29,931), and its rules of
procedure are Part 2 of Appendix A of ASPR (former rules-32 Code Fed. Regs., § 415a.1;
present rules-i CCH GCR, par. 10,721). For a discussion of the composition of and pro-
cedure before ASBCA, see Cuneo, "Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals: Tyrant or
Impartial Tribunal," 39 A.B.A.J. 373 (1953). That article is based upon the rules of the
ASBCA in effect prior to August 1, 1955. The procedure under the new rules is sub-
stantially the same as under the old rules except that now the contractor is required to file,
in addition to his notice of appeal, a complaint setting forth simple, concise and direct
statements of each of his claims in place of the old Rule 2 statement of specific facts and
argument in support of the appeal, and now the Government must file an answer setting
forth in simple, concise, and direct statements its defenses to each claim asserted by the
contractor in lieu of the old Rule 4 memorandum of the factual and legal issues in the
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The appeal procedure under construction contracts of the Department
of the Army is somewhat different. The Corps of Engineers has the ex-
clusive administration and performance of the civil works responsibilities
of the Department of the Army pertaining to river and harbor and flood
control activities of the United States. 116 The Chief of Engineers has been
designated as the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of the
Army under the "Disputes" article of all contracts concerning the civil
activities of the Department of the Army under the jurisdiction of the
Corps of Engineers. 117 The Chief of Engineers has in turn designated
the Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals Board as his authorized
representative to determine such appeals.
When the factual dispute is under a military construction contract of
the Department of the Army, examination of the "Disputes" article must
be made to ascertain definitely who has the authority to first hear and
determine an appeal from the decision of the contracting officer. The
"Disputes" article in most Army military construction contracts pro-
vides for an intermediate appeal" 8 before the Corps of Engineers Claims
and Appeals Board. If a contractor is not satisfied with the decision of
that Board he may, pursuant to the "Disputes" article, take a further
appeal to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Such appeal
before the latter Board is de novo.
If the question involved in the dispute between the contractor and the
contracting officer is not one of fact but one of law, such as one involv-
ing interpretation of a contractual provision, the contractor may appeal
directly to the proper court. Most contractors, with good reason, are hesi-
tant to say that their disputes involve only legal questions which may be
appealed directly to the courts. As a result, they appeal to the adminis-
trative board as insurance against losing their rights to appeal to the
courts." 9
The last two sentences of the "Changes" article are important. One
states that nothing provided in the article will excuse the contractor
appeal. The new rules specify motion and other procedui'es that were previously allowed
and followed by the ASBCA but were not set out in the old rules.
116. Army Regulations 10-260, February 25, 1949, as changed by C 4, March 24, 1954;
Special Regulations 10-5-1, April 11, 1950, as changed by C 2, August 1, 1951.
117. Basic delegation was set forth in a memorandum for the Chief of Engineers, dated
March 4, 1937, signed by the Secretary of War. The rules of procedure of the Corps of
Engineers Claims and Appeals Board may be found in 1A CCH GCR, par. 24,804.
118. Provision for the modification of the "Disputes" article to authorize such an Inter-
mediate appeal is set forth in ASPR 7-103.12, 32 Code Fed. Regs., § 406.103-12 (Supp.
1954), 1A CCH GCR, par. 29,363.
119. For an appraisal of the administrative appellate procedure available under Federal
Government construction contracts from the view of counsel for contractors, see Mulligan,
"Government Construction Contract," 27 Notre Dame Law. 167 (1992).
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from proceeding with the prosecution of the work as changed. Hence,
while the contractor may appeal his dispute with the contracting officer
to the appropriate Board of Contract Appeals, he must continue with the
performance of the work as ordered by the contracting officer.
The last sentence states that except as otherwise provided in the
"Changes" article, no charge for any extra work or material will be al-
lowed. As stated above, this provision is in lieu of the separate "Extras"
article that had previously been in Standard Form 23.
III. CONCLUSION
This analysis is sufficient to show that the law of Government con-
tracts, and in particular as it applies to changes, is in a state of develop-
ment. The courts still require rather strict compliance with the con-
tractual provisions. The administrative boards, on the other hand, as the
representatives of the heads of departments, are somewhat more liberal
in granting relief, as the Court of Claims recommended. That liberality
does not extend to being inconsistent with any judicial pronouncement,
such as the Supreme Court's decision in the Rice case.
Many risks have been eliminated by the use of the "Changes" article
and to that extent bids may be lower, as the contractor can, with a
greater degree of security, estimate his costs. This provision, however,
was not designed to protect the contractor who boasts that he will take
a job at cost and make his profit on changes and extras. Nor was it de-
signed to permit officials to bail out a contractor from an improvident
bid.
As a practical matter, it must be recognized that the "Changes" article
does give a certain amount of discretion to officials who, in making their
determinations, may be liberal yet honest. Similarly, it has created for
courts an additional relief provision in the contract that may be broadly
applied in the hardship case.
In the determination of the application of this article, or of any other
dispute, in a doubtful case appealing facts persuasively presented and
based on the proper legal foundation by skillful counsel is the best
formula for success whether before an administrative official or board
or before a court.
